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How Safe is "SafeEnough?"
FORUM
HOW SAFE IS "SAFEENOUGH?"
Cass D. Howell

A Edir question, is it not? When it comes to aviation safbty, just how & is safe enough? And, by the way,
who gets to make this decision? Most of the time those of us in the aviation pro&ssions are involved in daily
operational decisions that impact safety, but our view tends to be narrow and focused on a particular problem or
situation, thus we lose sight of the "big picture." So let's step back for a moment and take a broad look at how and
why policies, rules, and laws are made tbat affect aviation safety.

First of all, as is readily evident, there is no one
person, agency or company that is responsible for setting
"the'' standad fur safety, at least not in thiscountry. Even
organizations such as the FAA and airline safety
departments that am directly charged withestablishing and
enforcing safety regulationsand procedures are only part of

Not nemsady, because that concept is a constantly
moving target, and the benchinarks available in the 1950's
would have been c o w to a still earlier era. In the
1930's the commercial aviation accident rate was a
staggering 280 per 100,000 flight hours, so aviators and

theanswertothequestionofwhodecideshowsafeissafe
enough. In a system as large and complex as ours, which
accountsfmaboat halfofall oftheaviationwtivityinthe
world, safety policies are detemined by a multitude of
individuals and organizations, some of them not even
d i m t l y involved with aviation on a f m p n t basis.
Secondly, the standard of "safe enoughn is a constan@
moving target, usually evolving, but one that can be reset
in a single day. Let's examine this second concept before

operating very safely indeed.
Another benchmark is comparative statistics
among various oqanhtions, such as airline's accident
records compared to similar air carriers, which is very
useful for regulatorsand safety s-t
when deciding
that things are going well, or that improvements are in
order. The same applies tocomparisonsbetweencategories
of operations, for example Part 135 versus Part 121
operators, or military accident rates contrasted with civil
aviation rates. Thq aforementioned are some of the most
powerful indicators, because the lowest accident rates
indi~tewhat is aUually achievable in comparable
circumstanoes. And, of course, you have heard of a
common expression Meetingbenchmarkingwhen people
say, "Flying is a lot safer than driving," true for
commercial aviation but not necesady for General
Aviation operations.
Other benchmarks include comparisons among
different countries or world regions. This is p e r m more
usefulfor other countries than for the U.S.,since America
generally leads the world in lowest aircraft accident rates.
We most often compare ourselves to the combined
European accident rates,since they are usually quite close
to, or better than, U.S. mes Venturingbeyond Enrope and
North America, we see that some region's airlines are
operating at risk levels 10 or even 20 times greater than

going onto the question of who decide^.
The answer to the "safe enoughn question lies in
a milieu of separate but related standards that benchmark
safety levels. The govmment, among other institutions, is
in the business of establishing and enforcing regulations
and operating practices that affect safety, and all aviation

b t h t i o n s and agencies do some form of benchmarking
when deciding at what level to set standards. For example,
ifwe say that annme&al aviation today is reasonably safe,
we must say, "Compared to what?" The most ready
r e f e m is the commercial aircraft accident rate per
100,000 flight hours. For mishaps resulting in major
damage, up to and including hull loss the rate for scheduled
FAR Part 121 U.S. carriers in 2001 was 0.2. In 1959 the
same rate was more than 30.0. By this comparison flying
today is phenomenally safer than in years past. Does this
mean that aviationin pmious eras was not "safe enough?"
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U.S. m e r s .
Perception also plays an important role in the
assessment of how safe is safe enough. Although a
particular airline may have a very solid overall safety
record, a rash of accidents over a short time,or even a
single accident that reveals important safety deficiencies,
can w m m e any reservoir of public trust that may have
existed. The poster child for thisarncept is the crashof the
Valujet DC-9 in the Florida Everglades in 19%. That was
the only accident Valujet ever had, but its name became
synonymous with shoddy safety practices, so much so that
the company was f o d to changethe name in order to stay
in business.
Of course, September 1lmwas thegreatest change
of all time regarding the concept of safe enougb, and we
will see changes for years to come as the nation struggles
tosatisfysafetyconcernsthatarestillri~gabout.
A final note on "safe enough." Even if there is
consensusthat flight operations are reasonably safe it does

notmeanthatincfustryorthegwemmentsitontheir
laurels and do not pursue improvements. To our collective
credit, there is widespread determination that although
current safety records may be acaqtable, there is always
room for improvement, and that a zero accident rate is
always the final goal.
In a democracy such as ours, decision making and
policy setting at the national level (and below as well) is a
highly participatory process, invomg quite a diverse cast
of characters.Forthe purpose ofthis discussion I will call
the groups "safety organhtions," though in the true sense
of the word some are not actually organizations. All,
however, exert si@cant influence in the aviation safety
arena, and provide the answer to the question of who
decides how safe is safe enough. They utilize the
aforementioned markers, plus add some of their own.
Pilot Unions are, of course,highly concerned with
commercial aircraft safety, given that their members are
affected by the lack of it in a highly personal way.
M o w e r , a well-organizedunion is in a position to make
demands of management, force concessions from (or at
least embarrass) management regarding safety issues,
whether they are operational, training or equipment
concerns. Another role filled by pilot unions is to bring to
e
w ofthe air curiers
attention issues outside the direct m
that affect safety, such as publication ofthe "Black Star"
list of unsafe airports. In this category also fell pilot union
public campaigningagainst theFxmh-made ATR series of

turboprop aimaft that were seen as manifestly unsafe in
icing conditions, even when properly flown.
Aviation Insurance C o d e s can play a large
..
role in demmmq acceptable safety levels. Particularly
for smaller operato* imuance companies can dictate
minimum hiring standards for pilots, set their recurrent

training requirements, and establish ground safety
p~ufe~thatexceedFAArequirements,butthatmustbe
complied with in order to obtain insurance. For insurance
companies, safe enough is readily quantifiable into a
number that represents monetary profit or loss. Any
immnce company that is driven into the red by its client's
high accident rate will most assuredly determinethat "safe
enough" has not been achieved.
Effective and Accessible L e d &stem, as used
here, refers to the ability of individual members of the
societyto achieveredressfor thenegligenceor malfeasance
ofthose who have caused them harm. Perhaps the United
States, more so than any other country, exemplifies this
trait. Indeed, it may not even be necessary to p m
negligenceor malfeasance,sincejust the threat ofa lawsuit
could yield large settlements against air carriers and
manufacturers. The economic pain that comes with large
judgments, or a series of them, is a huge economic
incentive for companies to err on the side of safety, since
the civil penalties followingan adverse trial could spell the
death knell for all but the strongest aviation businesses.
Free and ODen Media. A society that has an
unrestrained and inquisitivemedia, assuming a degree of
integrity is present, is better infonned than one that does
nat Though hard to quanw, the level of media reporting
of unsafe wmmercial aviation activities is in itself a
benchmark. First, the extensive coverage of an airliner
crash alone can result in dramatic drops in passenger
volumes, with the attendant plunge in revenues. Although
the airlines don't typically publicize passenger decliues
following the crash of one of their airliners, the events and
aftermathof September 11 provideampleevidemeofthis
correlation. On top of the loss of revenue due to empty
seats is the tendency of the accompanying volumes of
adverse publicity to result in legislation that may M e r
regulate or restricta carrier's operations, causingadditional
economic penalties, at least in the short run. The
requkment that all air carriers in the U.S. install TCAS in
short order was the direct result of the collision of a
Aemmexico DC-9 and a Piper Archer in the vicinity of the
largest media market in America, Los Angeles, in 1986.
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Lastly,in a democracy, public opinion itself is a
banmeter expressing confidence, or the lack of it, in the
adequacy of safety measures in the nation's commercial
aviation system. This occurs two ways: One, by avoidance
behavior directed at a particular airline, or in the case of
September 1lm,at all airlines; and two, by expressing their
concerns to their elected representatives. The public, as
well as industry organizations and trade groups, also
provide input on how much safety they are willing or able
to pay for, since in large part safety is determhed by the
amount of money available to fund it.
It is the
aforementionedplayers in the dety arena acting on their

individual concerns that set and prioritize much of the
safety agenda in this country. Ultimately these concerns
are reflected back to the aviation industry via the actions of
the FAA and other government agencies. This is not to say
that the FAA or NTSB or other agencies concerned with
flight safety don't hdepedently make "safe enoughn
judgments, but the reality is that decision making is far
more complex than it may seem at first blush. In the final
analysis, there are no simple answers to the simple "who"
and "safe enough" questions.+

Cass D. Howell is an Associate Prolbwr of Aeronautical Science at Embry-Riddle Aemmtical University in Daytona Beach,
norida. He specializes in aviation safety and human factors topics.
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